Journal
SYNTHESE
Volume 198, Issue 12, Pages 11327-11349Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-020-02791-0
Keywords
Time bias; Future bias; Bias toward the future; Temporal value asymmetry; Retrocausation; Experimental philosophy; Temporal preferences
Categories
Funding
- Icelandic Centre for Research [195617-051]
- Ngai Tai Ki Tamaki Tribal Trust
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Most people tend to be biased towards the future, preferring positive experiences ahead. This bias may stem from the inability to change the past, leading to a general disposition to accept what cannot be changed. However, individuals still exhibit future bias even when able to influence the past, suggesting a complex interplay of factors contributing to this phenomenon.
Philosophers have long noted, and empirical psychology has lately confirmed, that most people are biased toward the future: we prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. At least two explanations have been offered for this bias: (1) belief intemporal passage(or related theses in temporal metaphysics) and (2) thepractical irrelevanceof the past resulting from our inability to influence past events. We set out to test the latter explanation. In a large survey (n = 1462), we find that participants exhibit significantly less future bias when asked to consider scenarios where they can affect their own past experiences. This supports the practical irrelevance explanation of future bias. It also suggests that future bias is not an inflexible preference hardwired by evolution, but results from a more general disposition to accept the things we cannot change. However, participants still exhibited substantial future bias in scenarios in which they could affect the past, leaving room for complementary explanations. Beyond the main finding, our results also indicate that future bias isstake-sensitive(i.e., that at least some peoplediscountpast experience rather than disregarding it entirely) and that participants endorse the normative correctness of their future-biased preferences and choices. In combination, these results shed light on philosophical debates over the rationality of future bias, suggesting that it may be a rational (reasons-responsive) response to empirical realities rather than a brute, arational disposition.
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