4.5 Article

A DEA cross-efficiency approach based on bargaining theory

Journal

JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY
Volume 72, Issue 5, Pages 1156-1167

Publisher

TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/01605682.2020.1755898

Keywords

Data envelopment analysis; cross-efficiency; bargaining theory; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Funding

  1. Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities [PGC2018-095786-B-I00]

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The paper introduces a new method based on bargaining problems and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to discriminate between optimal weighting profiles, addressing the non-uniqueness issue in cross-efficiency evaluation.
Cross-efficiency evaluation is a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach that enables the efficiency and ranking of Decision-Making Units (DMUs) to assess the possibility of idiosyncratic weighting schemes. However, the existence of multiple optimal weights in multiplier DEA models implies the non-uniqueness of the cross-efficiency evaluation. This is normally dealt with using secondary goals that enable the optimal weighting vectors to be chosen. In this paper, a new method to discriminate between optimal weighting profiles is proposed based on bargaining problems and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. In this approach, the input and output multipliers are agreed upon by the peer DMUs.

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