4.5 Article

Dynamic multicriteria games with asymmetric players

Journal

JOURNAL OF GLOBAL OPTIMIZATION
Volume 83, Issue 3, Pages 521-537

Publisher

SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10898-020-00929-5

Keywords

Dynamic games; Multicriteria games; Multi-objective optimization; Asymmetric players; Nash bargaining solution; Cooperative solution

Funding

  1. Shandong province Double-Hundred Talent Plan [WST2017009]

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This paper presents a new approach to construct cooperative behavior in dynamic multicriteria games with asymmetric players by combining the ideas of multi-objective optimization and game theory. The concepts of multicriteria Nash equilibrium and multicriteria cooperative equilibrium are introduced by adopting the bargaining solution and applying a compromise scheme that guarantees the fulfillment of rationality conditions. The paper also considers the dynamic stability concept for dynamic multicriteria games and presents a time-consistent payoff distribution procedure. A dynamic bi-criteria bioresource management problem is discussed to illustrate the strategies and payoffs of players under cooperative and noncooperative behavior.
In this paper a new approach to construct cooperative behavior in dynamic multicriteria games with asymmetric players is presented. To obtain noncooperative and cooperative equilibria the ideas of multi-objective optimization and game theory are combined. To construct a multicriteria Nash equilibrium the bargaining solution is adopted. To design a multicriteria cooperative equilibrium a compromise scheme that guarantees the fulfillment of rationality conditions is applied. The concept of dynamic stability is adopted for dynamic multicriteria games, and the time-consistent payoff distribution procedure is presented. A dynamic bi-criteria bioresource management problem with different discount factors is considered. The strategies and payoffs of players are obtained under cooperative and noncooperative behavior.

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