Detection of global positioning system spoofing attack on unmanned aerial vehicle system

Most of the existing global positioning system (GPS) spoofing detection schemes are vulnerable to the generative GPS spoofing attack, or require additional auxiliary equipment and extensive signal processing capabilities, leading to defects such as low real-time performance and large communication overhead which are not available for the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, also known as drone) system. Therefore, we propose a novel solution which employs information fusion based on the GPS receiver and inertial measurement unit. We use a real-time model of tracking and calculating to derive the current position of the drones which are then contrasted with the position information received by the receiver to verify whether the presence or absence of spoofing attack. Subsequent experimental work shows that, the proposed method can accurately detect the spoof within 8 seconds, with a detection rate (DR) of 98.6%. Compared with the existing schemes, the performance of real-time detecting is improved while the DR is ensured. Even in our worst-case, we detect the spoof within 28 seconds after the UAV system starts its mission.

Automated summary

Most of the existing GPS spoofing detection schemes are vulnerable to generative GPS spoofing attacks or require additional equipment and extensive signal processing capabilities, which are not suitable for UAV systems. To address this, we propose a novel solution that combines GPS receiver and inertial measurement unit information fusion. Experimental results show that our method can accurately detect spoofing attacks in 8 seconds with a detection rate of 98.6%. Compared to existing schemes, our method improves real-time detection performance while maintaining a high detection rate. In the worst-case scenario, we can detect the spoofing attack within 28 seconds after the UAV system starts its mission.