Journal
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Volume 283, Issue -, Pages -Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2020.103269
Keywords
Logic; Blameworthiness; Responsibility; Knowledge; Strategies; Know-how; Axiomatization; Completeness
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Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents can be defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should be a minimal one that had a strategy to prevent the outcome. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should be the minimal one that knew that it had a strategy and what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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