4.7 Article

Promoting Users' Participation in Mobile Crowdsourcing: A Distributed Truthful Incentive Mechanism (DTIM) Approach

Journal

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY
Volume 69, Issue 5, Pages 5570-5582

Publisher

IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TVT.2020.2982243

Keywords

Crowdsourcing; incentive mechanism; auction; strategy-proof; budget balance

Funding

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [61872150, 61872149]
  2. Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation [2020A1515011209]
  3. Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province for Distinguished Young Scholar [2018B030306010]
  4. Guangdong Special Support Program [2017TQ04X482]
  5. Pearl River S&T Nova Program of Guangzhou [201806010088]
  6. Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
  7. Key Project of Science and Technology Innovation 2030 through Ministry of Science and Technology of China [2018AAA0101300]

Ask authors/readers for more resources

With the advancement of smartphones, mobile crowdsourcing has become a new computing paradigm to efficiently support novel mobile applications. Achieving good service quality of these applications, however, necessitates the participation of large number of smartphones, which can be obtained via providing suitable incentives to smartphone users. Nonetheless, most existing incentive mechanisms assume a centralized platform for recruiting smartphones, which is prone to expose the privacy of both smartphones and task requesters. In this context, this article studies a distributed truthful incentive mechanism (DTIM) for mobile crowdsourcing, where multiple auction rounds can be conducted locally in each smartphone and task requester. Specifically, in each auction round, the participating smartphones act as the sellers and submit bids to compete for their intended crowdsourcing tasks. The task requesters, on the other hand, act as the buyers that decide on the sellers and corresponding payments, depending on their submitted bids. Finally, based on the offered payment, each smartphone selects a buyer for trading to optimize its utility. It is shown that the proposed incentive mechanism is strategy-proof, budget balanced, individually rational, and computationally efficient. Numerical results provided corroborate the beneficial properties of the scheme.

Authors

I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.

Reviews

Primary Rating

4.7
Not enough ratings

Secondary Ratings

Novelty
-
Significance
-
Scientific rigor
-
Rate this paper

Recommended

No Data Available
No Data Available