Research on Air Pollution Control in China: From the Perspective of Quadrilateral Evolutionary Games

By constructing a quadrilateral evolutionary game model involving the central government, local governments, polluting enterprises, and the public, this paper attempts to comprehensively analyze the development and implementation of China's air pollution control policies. Through the quadrilateral evolutionary game model, this paper systematically studies the evolutionary stable strategies of the four parties involved and obtains 27 equilibrium points, strategy sets, and their corresponding policy performance with the help of the four-dimensional dynamic system. The research results show that there are five equilibrium points that represent the least ideal scenarios, 14 equilibrium points that represent the less than ideal scenarios, four equilibrium points that represent the ideal scenarios, three equilibrium points that represent the more than ideal scenarios, and one equilibrium point that represents the most ideal scenarios. By analyzing the eight equilibrium points that represent the ideal, more than ideal and most ideal scenarios, especially the four stable points, this paper has obtained the conditions as well as policy implications of the four stable points in China's air pollution control campaign.