Why can't what is true be valuable?

In recent discussions of the so-called value of truth, it is assumed thatwhatis valuable in the relevant way is not the things that are true, but only various states and activities associated with those things: knowing them, investigating them, etc. I consider all the arguments I know of for this assumption, and argue that none provide good reason to accept it. By examining these arguments, we gain a better appreciation of what the value of the things that are true would be, and why it would matter. We also encounter three indications that what is true really is valuable, each of which provides a promising starting point for a serious argument with that conclusion.

Automated summary

By examining the assumptions and arguments presented in recent discussions about the value of truth, we can gain a better understanding of the importance of truth and its intrinsic value. Additionally, three indications suggest that truth is indeed valuable, providing promising starting points for further serious arguments on this conclusion.