Journal
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES
Volume 104, Issue -, Pages 60-67Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.01.008
Keywords
Bargaining problem; Bargaining solution; Dominant strategy implementation; Welfarism; Dictatorial solution
Categories
Funding
- JSPS, Japan KAKENHI [JP22730165, JP22330061, JP15H03328, JP16K03567, JP17K03628]
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We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy implementable allocation rules and impose the property of welfarism, which makes it possible for any allocation rule to induce a bargaining solution. Our main result is that an allocation rule is dominant strategy implementable and satisfies welfarism and some mild requirements if and only if it induces a dictatorial solution. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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