Journal
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
Volume 66, Issue 7-8, Pages 933-957Publisher
WILEY
DOI: 10.1002/joom.1079
Keywords
behavioral experiment; conjoint analysis; information protection; innovation novelty; signaling theory; supplier selection; supplier ties
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A supplier's interorganizational ties can be a source of novelty as well as information leakage risk when a buyer involves suppliers in a new product development project. We use signaling theory to explain how supplier ties affect a purchasing manager's perception of suppliers. Three types of supplier ties are considered: ties with external innovation partners, with customers outside the buying firm's industry, and with the buying firm's competitors. We posit that managers use supplier ties as signals to indicate a supplier's potential in contributing to innovation novelty or information protection. Results from two scenario-based experiments with practicing managers support most of our hypotheses. When innovation novelty is the goal, managers perceive other-industry customer ties and external innovation ties as positive signals, while competitor ties as a negative signal. When information protection is the goal, all three types of ties are perceived negatively. When both goals are considered, information protection has a greater influence than innovation novelty on the final supplier selection likelihood.
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