Transboundary water sharing problem; a theoretical analysis using evolutionary game and system dynamics

Water is the backbone of socio-economic and environmental systems. Increasing demand and unpredictable availability due to anthropogenic climate change is making water an extremely scarce resource in different parts of the world, when the resources facing scarcity are shared between different administrative boundaries, conflicts could arise. Transboundary river basins are typical examples. Water sharing problems within these transboundary river basins are very difficult to solve because of the socio-economic and environmental asymmetries among the water claiming stakeholders. In addition, water-sharing problems have a systemic feature that evolves through time. Previous studies did not comprehensively capture these features. This article attempts to fill this research gap by combining the evolutionary game and system dynamic model to predict the equilibrium outcomes of different strategic scenarios. When the riparian states choose polarizing strategies, the equilibrium evolves either quickly, initiated by the countries' need to avoid the loss that could result from water conflict or very slowly if the countries opt to maintain the benefits that result from their polarized strategies. In the scenario where both choose a tolerance strategy, the equilibrium evolves very slowly. If either of the countries chooses a polarizing strategy irrespective of its neighbor choosing a compromise strategy, the equilibrium evolves much faster. The results depicted that the equilibrium under different scenarios does not always lead to concessions. Therefore, the countries should strengthen the cooperation in water resource management to ensure that a zero-sum game and the inception of a new strategic evolution are prevented.