Three perspectives on relational values of nature

Relational value (RV) has recently been introduced as a third class of values for understanding values of nature and are thought to sit alongside more familiar axiological categories such as instrumental and intrinsic value. The concept has quickly gained ground in and promises to better capture how people and collectives perceive of their wellbeing and make choices that involve the natural world. While the idea of relational value is not without merits, its initial and current conceptualization raises questions about how it relates to existing value concepts. Here, we start from an interdisciplinary perspective and delineate how the concept can contribute to addressing problems in three fields that deal with environmental values in different ways: environmental ethics; ecosystem services valuation; and environmental psychology. We provide an overview of value concepts in each field and show how relational value has been described or applied. Our analysis shows that value concepts are used to solve different problems in the three fields, and these differences have implications for how relational value can be framed and situated in values theory. These differences involve e.g., the descriptive question of how people value nature versus the normative questions of why nature should be valued. We show how the concept can be seen as solving the problem of narrow conceptualizations of intrinsic and instrumental value in ecosystem services valuation and suggest that RV can be conceived of as an epistemological framing rather than a values concept. The concept also has potential to function as a 'boundary object' to provide cross-fertilization of disciplinary perspectives.