Journal
JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION
Volume 221, Issue -, Pages 526-535Publisher
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.02.253
Keywords
Construction waste minimization; Willingness of design unit; Critical factor; Structural equation modeling
Categories
Funding
- Shenzhen Science and Technology Plan [JCYJ20160520173631894]
- Shenzhen University Graduate Innovation Development Fund Project [31500004131]
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Construction waste minimization in design stage can reduce construction waste from sources. Design unit is regarded as a key stakeholder in this stage and plays a critical role in reducing construction waste. However, the limited studies focused on factors affecting their willingness towards construction waste. To fill this research gap, this study explored the critical factors which affect design units' willingness towards construction waste minimization using exploratory sequential mixed method. Literature bibliometric and semi-structured interviews were initially conducted to identify influencing factors of the willingness of design units towards construction waste minimization. Questionnaire survey was used for data collection and Structural equation modeling was then used for analyzing factorial interactions. It is indicated that social and market environment exerts the greatest positive effects on design units' willingness towards construction waste minimization, followed by government supervision and minimization attitude of designers, while effect of project constraints seems minimal. Furthermore, enterprise internal culture indirectly affects design units' willingness towards construction waste minimization by influencing minimization attitude of designers. Moreover, strategies and suggestions were proposed from perspectives of society, government, design units, and clients, respectively. Findings of this empirical study provide theoretical reference for improving relevant standards and regulations regarding construction waste minimization design with establishing incentive mechanisms. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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