Journal
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL POWER & ENERGY SYSTEMS
Volume 108, Issue -, Pages 72-85Publisher
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijepes.2018.12.031
Keywords
Customers cost (CC); Coupon fairness allocation; Demand response (DR); Profits of aggregator (POA); Shapley Value (SV)
Categories
Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [51707029]
- Sichuan Youth Science and Technology Innovation Team [2017TD0009]
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Demand response (DR) program caters finance incentives to electricity users to reduce demand in contingency. This paper has proposed a Shapley Value (SV) determined incentives apportioning method for end-users when wholesale pricing rises. SV achieves maximal profits equilibrium for each participant in grand coalition game. The effects of SV-based DR are examined with two IEEE benchmark distribution networks, 33-bus and 8500-node. Numerical studies in 33-bus distribution network unveil that by considering the fairness mechanism in SV-DR program, retailers earn 4.39% more profits and SV improves users willingness 1.47 larger than the conventional DR program. It is demonstrated that SV-DR program helps retailers assure profitability, and also enhances customers initiatives.
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