Related references
Note: Only part of the references are listed.SEGMENTING FARE EVADER GROUPS BY FACTOR AND CLUSTER ANALYSIS
Sara Salis et al.
URBAN TRANSPORT XXIII (2018)
Mechanisms that govern how the Price of Anarchy varies with travel demand
Steven J. O'Hare et al.
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL (2016)
Decreasing fare evasion without fines? A microeconomic analysis
Pablo Guarda et al.
RESEARCH IN TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS (2016)
Cluster analysis of fare evasion behaviours in Melbourne, Australia
Alexa Delbosc et al.
TRANSPORT POLICY (2016)
Optimal choices of fare collection systems for public transportations: Barrier versus barrier-free
Yasuo Sasaki
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL (2014)
Fare evasion in proof-of-payment transit systems: Deriving the optimum inspection level
Benedetto Barabino et al.
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL (2014)
Unethical behavior in the field: Demographic characteristics and beliefs of the cheater
Alessandro Bucciol et al.
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION (2013)
TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems Using Game Theory
Zhengyu Yin et al.
AI MAGAZINE (2012)
Measuring and Controlling Subway Fare Evasion Improving Safety and Security at New York City Transit Authority
Alla V. Reddy et al.
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD (2011)
Drawing the line: how inspectors enact deviant behaviors
Jean-Baptiste Suquet
JOURNAL OF SERVICES MARKETING (2010)
Deterrence and fare evasion: Results of a natural experiment
Ronald V. Clarke et al.
SECURITY JOURNAL (2010)
The Optimal Transit Fare Structure under Different Market Regimes with Uncertainty in the Network
Zhi-Chun Li et al.
NETWORKS & SPATIAL ECONOMICS (2009)
The Effects of Increasing the Certainty of Punishment
Martin Killias et al.
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY (2009)
The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance
Nina Mazar et al.
JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH (2008)