4.7 Article

Pricing and coordination strategies of a dual-channel supply chain considering green quality and sales effort

Journal

JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION
Volume 218, Issue -, Pages 409-424

Publisher

ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.01.297

Keywords

Dual-channel supply chain; Substitute products; Green quality; Sales effort; Game theory; Channel coordination

Funding

  1. project E-Business Center of Excellence - Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD), Government of India under the scheme of center for training and research in the frontier areas of science and technology (FAST) [5-5/2014-TS.VII]

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Due to the rapid growth of the internet and smartphone users, the shopping behavior of customers is changing towards online purchasing. Hence, a manufacturer would like to include an online (direct) channel along with offline (indirect) channel. This study investigates the pricing strategies and coordination mechanism between the members in a dual-channel supply chain (DCSC). A manufacturer offers a new substitutable green (eco-friendly) product through a direct channel and a non-green (traditional) product through an offline retail channel. The demand is expressed as a linear function of selling (online/offline) prices, green quality level, and sales effort level. In this study, three models (centralized, decentralized, and collaboration) have been examined in the DCSC. A Stackelberg game-theoretic approach is applied to analyze the decentralized model, and the channel coordination is achieved through the surplus profit-sharing mechanism to obtain a win-win situation for each member of the supply chain. The optimal results are compared, and a sensitivity analysis is carried out to study the effect of some key parameters. It is revealed that the green quality level is high in the collaboration model, which is beneficial from the environmental perspective. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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