Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders

Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called direct social perception (DSP): the idea that we can sometimes perceive features of other minds directly in the character of their embodiment and environmental interactions. I argue that if DSP is true, we can probably also perceive certain features of mental disorders as well. I draw upon the developmental psychologist Daniel Stern's notion of forms of vitality-largely overlooked in these debates-to develop this idea, and I use autism as a case study. I argue further that an enactive approach to DSP can clarify some ways we play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of the disorder in question, and it may therefore have practical significance for both the clinical and therapeutic encounter.

Automated summary

Enactive approaches to cognition emphasize the connection between cognition and action, as well as the externalization of cognitive activities through embodiment and ecological interactions. The idea of Direct Social Perception (DSP) suggests that we can directly perceive features of other minds, including certain characteristics of mental disorders. By using an enactive approach, we can clarify the role we play in shaping the temporal and phenomenal characteristics of disorders, which can have practical significance for clinical and therapeutic encounters.