Journal
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Volume 86, Issue 3, Pages 522-550Publisher
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
DOI: 10.1086/703552
Keywords
-
Categories
Funding
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Ask authors/readers for more resources
I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent's credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also known as generalized information entropy). This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes to epistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules in epistemic utility theory, and the selection of priors in Bayesian epistemology more generally (including the Laplacean principle of indifference).
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available