Journal
AUTOMATICA
Volume 100, Issue -, Pages 274-280Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2018.11.034
Keywords
DoS attacks; Incomplete information; Stackelberg game; Power control
Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [61703286]
Ask authors/readers for more resources
In this paper, the optimal power schedule is studied for the wireless communication network under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Different from Nash Equilibrium (NE), a Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) framework is proposed to analyze the game between the defender and the attacker under two different types of incomplete information. In the first scenario, the defender only knows the statistical characteristics about whether the attacker exists or not, which means that the defender knows the probability that there is only background noise on the environment. In the second situation, the defender does not know the total power of the attacker exactly and only acquires to know the total power with certain probability. Moreover, the detailed steps of designing both players' optimal strategies are given and analyzed. Adaptive Penalty Function (APF) approach and Differential Evolution (DE) algorithm are combined to deal with the corresponding nonlinear and non-convex optimization issues. Finally, examples are provided to illustrate the results proposed in this work. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available