4.6 Article

Merleau-Ponty and the radical sciences of mind

Journal

SYNTHESE
Volume 198, Issue SUPPL 9, Pages 2243-2277

Publisher

SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-02015-6

Keywords

Merleau-Ponty; Phenomenology; Gestalt psychology; Cognitive science; Enactivism; Ecological psychology

Funding

  1. College of Humanities at California State University, Northridge

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This paper critically examines the development of Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology and radical embodied cognitive science from Berlin-School Gestalt theory, highlighting Merleau-Ponty's adoption of an ontology of flesh. His arguments for this ontology rely on criticisms of Gestalt Psychology, leading him into a realm of romantic philosophy.
In this paper, I critically reconstruct the development of Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology and radical embodied cognitive science out of Berlin-School Gestalt theory. I first lay out the basic principles of Gestalt theory and then identify two ways of revising that theory: one route, followed by enactivism and ecological psychology, borrows Gestaltist resources to defend a pragmatic ontology. I argue, however, that Merleau-Ponty never endorses this kind of ontology. Instead, I track his second route toward an ontology of flesh. I show how Merleau-Ponty's arguments for this ontology depend upon criticisms of Gestalt Psychology to which radical embodied cognitive science remains vulnerable, and show that it leads him to a romantic philosophy of nature.

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