Merleau-Ponty and the radical sciences of mind

In this paper, I critically reconstruct the development of Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology and radical embodied cognitive science out of Berlin-School Gestalt theory. I first lay out the basic principles of Gestalt theory and then identify two ways of revising that theory: one route, followed by enactivism and ecological psychology, borrows Gestaltist resources to defend a pragmatic ontology. I argue, however, that Merleau-Ponty never endorses this kind of ontology. Instead, I track his second route toward an ontology of flesh. I show how Merleau-Ponty's arguments for this ontology depend upon criticisms of Gestalt Psychology to which radical embodied cognitive science remains vulnerable, and show that it leads him to a romantic philosophy of nature.

Automated summary

This paper critically examines the development of Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology and radical embodied cognitive science from Berlin-School Gestalt theory, highlighting Merleau-Ponty's adoption of an ontology of flesh. His arguments for this ontology rely on criticisms of Gestalt Psychology, leading him into a realm of romantic philosophy.