Journal
SYNTHESE
Volume 198, Issue SUPPL 7, Pages 1711-1723Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-02024-5
Keywords
Epistemology of disagreement; Epistemology; Intellectual humility; Intellectual character
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While conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagreement are widely accepted, inherent problems suggest that non-conciliatory alternatives may be stronger, particularly in resisting the impact of peer disagreement on epistemic justification.
It is widely accepted that one strong motivation for adopting a conciliatory stance with regard to the epistemology of peer disagreement is that the non-conciliatory alternatives are incompatible with the demands of intellectual character, and incompatible with the virtue of intellectual humility in particular. It is argued that this is a mistake, at least once we properly understand what intellectual humility involves. Given some of the inherent problems facing conciliatory proposals, it is maintained that non-conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagreement are thus on much stronger dialectical ground than many suppose, including some defenders of this line. In particular, non-conciliatory proposals can resist the idea that epistemic peer disagreement directly weakens one's epistemic justification, as conciliatory views maintain. This means that the epistemic justification that our beliefs in this regard enjoy, and thus our knowledge, is more secure than conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagreement would suggest.
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