Game Analysis of Determinants of Stability of Semiconductor Modular Production Networks

In today's rapidly changing environment, semiconductor manufacturers compete more in the area of modular production networks. However, the instability of semiconductor modular production networks can to a large extent lead to the failure of these networks. The aim of this paper is to discuss the significance and explore the maintenance of the stability of these semiconductor modular production networks. Firstly, this paper qualitatively and quantitatively defines the stability of semiconductor modular production networks. Based on this, by establishing game models, this paper analyzes the influence mechanism of the main factors: external market fluctuation, the internal benefit allocation mechanism, and opportunism, which can jeopardize the stability of these networks. We find that: the greater the benefits a member enterprise derives from the common benefits, the more likely it is the member enterprise will not exit the modular production network; the adaptive ability of the networks to the external environment is closely related to the stability of the modular production networks; the supervision and punishment in networks can be substituted for each other and the level of supervision, punishment and trust can exert great influence on the stability of semiconductor modular production networks. Lastly, we propose some specific suggestions.