Journal
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL
Volume 43, Issue 10, Pages 952-965Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2009.04.001
Keywords
Airport competition; Vertical collusion
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This paper develops a model of airport and airline competition in a three-stage game. We analyse incentives for vertical collusion between one airport and one airline that compete with another airport and another airline, by means of static and dynamic games. We find that incentives for collusion exist when airports and airlines have different market sizes and, under certain conditions. also when secondary airports and low cost airlines compete with main airports and full service airlines. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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