Journal
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Volume 111, Issue 46, Pages 16425-16430Publisher
NATL ACAD SCIENCES
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1407887111
Keywords
evolutionary game theory; alliances; public goods game; volunteer's dilemma; cooperation
Categories
Funding
- Schrodinger scholarship of the Austrian Science Fund [J3475]
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [J 3475] Funding Source: researchfish
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [J3475] Funding Source: Austrian Science Fund (FWF)
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Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. However, in large groups, these mechanisms may become ineffective because they require single individuals to have a substantial influence on their peers. However, the recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma suggests that we may have underestimated the degree of control that a single player can exert. Here, we develop a theory for zero-determinant strategies for iterated multiplayer social dilemmas, with any number of involved players. We distinguish several particularly interesting subclasses of strategies: fair strategies ensure that the own payoff matches the average payoff of the group; extortionate strategies allow a player to perform above average; and generous strategies let a player perform below average. We use this theory to describe strategies that sustain cooperation, including generalized variants of Tit-for-Tat and Win-Stay Lose-Shift. Moreover, we explore two models that show how individuals can further enhance their strategic options by coordinating their play with others. Our results highlight the importance of individual control and coordination to succeed in large groups.
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