Journal
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Volume 110, Issue 38, Pages 15348-15353Publisher
NATL ACAD SCIENCES
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1306246110
Keywords
evolution of cooperation; altruism; evolutionary stability; nash
Categories
Funding
- Burroughs Wellcome Fund
- David and Lucile Packard Foundation
- James S. McDonnell Foundation
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Foundational Questions in Evolutionary Biology Fund [RFP-12-16]
- US Army Research Office [W911NF-12-1-0552]
- US Department of the Interior [D12AP00025]
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Recent work has revealed a new class of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies for iterated, two-player games. ZD strategies allow a player to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between her score and her opponent's score, and thus to achieve an unusual degree of control over both players' long-term payoffs. Although originally conceived in the context of classical two-player game theory, ZD strategies also have consequences in evolving populations of players. Here, we explore the evolutionary prospects for ZD strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD). Several recent studies have focused on the evolution of extortion strategies, a subset of ZD strategies, and have found them to be unsuccessful in populations. Nevertheless, we identify a different subset of ZD strategies, called generous ZD strategies, that forgive defecting opponents but nonetheless dominate in evolving populations. For all but the smallest population sizes, generous ZD strategies are not only robust to being replaced by other strategies but can selectively replace any noncooperative ZD strategy. Generous strategies can be generalized beyond the space of ZD strategies, and they remain robust to invasion. When evolution occurs on the full set of all IPD strategies, selection disproportionately favors these generous strategies. In some regimes, generous strategies outperform even the most successful of the well-known IPD strategies, including win-stay-lose-shift.
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