Related references
Note: Only part of the references are listed.The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
Satoshi Uchida et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2010)
Evolution of direct and indirect reciprocity
Gilbert Roberts
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES (2008)
Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
Shinsuke Suzuki et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2007)
Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
Shinsuke Suzuki et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2007)
Tag-based indirect reciprocity by incomplete social information
Naoki Masuda et al.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES (2007)
Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
Hisashi Ohtsuki et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2007)
Five rules for the evolution of cooperation
Martin A. Nowak
SCIENCE (2006)
The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
Nobuyuki Takahashi et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2006)
Stern-judging: A simple, successful norm which promotes cooperation under indirect reciprocity
Jorge M. Pacheco et al.
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY (2006)
The evolution of norms
F. A. C. C. Chalub et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2006)
Image scoring and cooperation in a cleaner fish mutualism
Redouan Bshary et al.
NATURE (2006)
The leading eight: Social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
H Ohtsuki et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2006)
Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment
I Seinen et al.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW (2006)
When does economic man dominate social behavior?
CF Camerer et al.
SCIENCE (2006)
Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
GE Bolton et al.
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS (2005)
Indirect reciprocity, image scoring, and moral hazard
H Brandt et al.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2005)
The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
H Brandt et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2004)
Strategic investment in reputation
D Semmann et al.
BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY (2004)
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
K Panchanathan et al.
NATURE (2004)
How should we define goodness? Reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
H Ohtsuki et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2004)
How effective are electronic reputation mechanisms? An experimental investigation
GE Bolton et al.
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (2004)
Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
MA Fishman
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2003)
A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
K Panchanathan et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2003)
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
M Mohtashemi et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2003)
Experimental games for the design of reputation management systems
C Keser
IBM SYSTEMS JOURNAL (2003)
The long-term benefits of human generosity in indirect reciprocity
C Wedekind et al.
CURRENT BIOLOGY (2002)
Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation
M Milinski et al.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES (2002)
Reputation helps solve the 'tragedy of the commons'
M Milinski et al.
NATURE (2002)
Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy?
M Milinski et al.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES (2001)
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
O Leimar et al.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES (2001)
Heterogeneity stabilizes reciprocal altruism interactions
MA Fishman et al.
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY (2001)
Cooperation through image scoring in humans
C Wedekind et al.
SCIENCE (2000)
Share Paper
