Journal
PHYSICAL REVIEW E
Volume 82, Issue 1, Pages -Publisher
AMER PHYSICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.82.016102
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Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [60674050, 60736022, 60528007]
- NSF/NIH [R01GM078986]
- John Templeton Foundation
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics at Harvard
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The distribution of wealth among individuals in real society can be well described by the Pareto principle or 80-20 rule. How does such heterogeneity in initial wealth distribution affect the emergence of public cooperation, when individuals, the rich and the poor, engage in a collective-risk enterprise, not to gain a profit but to avoid a potential loss? Here we address this issue by studying a simple but effective model based on threshold public goods games. We analyze the evolutionary dynamics for two distinct scenarios, respectively: one with fair sharers versus defectors and the other with altruists versus defectors. For both scenarios, particularly, we in detail study the dynamics of the population with dichotomic initial wealth-the rich versus the poor. Moreover, we demonstrate the possible steady compositions of the population and provide the conditions for stability of these steady states. We prove that in a population with heterogeneous wealth distribution, richer individuals are more likely to cooperate than poorer ones. Participants with lower initial wealth may choose to cooperate only if all players richer than them are cooperators. The emergence of pubic cooperation largely relies on rich individuals. Furthermore, whenever the wealth gap between the rich and the poor is sufficiently large, cooperation of a few rich individuals can substantially elevate the overall level of social cooperation, which is in line with the well-known Pareto principle. Our work may offer an insight into the emergence of cooperative behavior in real social situations where heterogeneous distribution of wealth among individual is omnipresent.
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