Journal
PHYSICAL REVIEW A
Volume 89, Issue 3, Pages -Publisher
AMER PHYSICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.89.032304
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Funding
- National Basic Research Program of China [2011CBA00200, 2011CB921200]
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [60921091, 61101137]
- French National Research Agency, through the HIPERCOM [2011-CHRI-006]
- DIRECCTE Ile-de-France through the QVPN [FEDER-41402]
- European Union through the Q-CERT [FP7-PEOPLE-2009-IAPP]
- NSERC
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Imperfect devices in commercial quantum key distribution systems open security loopholes that an eavesdropper may exploit. An example of one such imperfection is the wavelength-dependent coupling ratio of the fiber beam splitter. Utilizing this loophole, the eavesdropper can vary the transmittances of the fiber beam splitter at the receiver's side by inserting lights with wavelengths different from what is normally used. Here, we propose a wavelength attack on a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system using homodyne detection. By inserting light pulses at different wavelengths, this attack allows the eavesdropper to bias the shot-noise estimation even if it is done in real time. Based on experimental data, we discuss the feasibility of this attack and suggest a prevention scheme by improving the previously proposed countermeasures.
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