Journal
PHYSICAL REVIEW A
Volume 78, Issue 4, Pages -Publisher
AMER PHYSICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.78.042333
Keywords
-
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Quantum-key-distribution (QKD) systems can send quantum signals over more than 100 km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally a technologically feasible attack-namely, the time-shift attack-against a commercial QKD system. Our result shows that, contrary to popular belief, an eavesdropper, Eve, has a non-negligible probability (similar to 4%) to break the security of the system. Eve's success is due to the well-known detection efficiency loophole in the experimental testing of Bell's inequalities. Therefore, the detection efficiency loophole plays a key role not only in fundamental physics, but also in technological applications such as QKD systems.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available