Journal
PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS
Volume 391, Issue 15, Pages 3924-3929Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2012.03.016
Keywords
Selective investment; Public goods game; Cooperation
Categories
Funding
- 973 Program [2012CB821203]
- NSFC [61020106005, 10972002, 90920304]
- BJNSF [4113071]
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Most previous investigations on spatial Public Goods Game assume that individuals treat neighbors equivalently, which is in sharp contrast with realistic situations, where bias is ubiquitous. We construct a model to study how a selective investment mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation. Cooperators selectively contribute to just a fraction among their neighbors. According to the interaction result, the investment network can be adapted. On selecting investees, three patterns are considered. In the random pattern, cooperators choose their investees among the neighbors equiprobably. In the social-preference pattern, cooperators tend to invest to individuals possessing large social ties. In the wealth-preference pattern, cooperators are more likely to invest to neighbors with higher payoffs. Our result shows robustness of selective investment mechanism that boosts emergence and maintenance of cooperation. Cooperation is more or less hampered under the latter two patterns, and we prove the anti-social-preference or anti-wealth-preference pattern of selecting investees can accelerate cooperation to some extent. Furthermore, the theoretical analysis of our mechanism on double-star networks coincides with simulation results. We hope our finding could shed light on better understanding of the emergence of cooperation among adaptive populations. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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