Journal
PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
Volume 366, Issue 1563, Pages 325-332Publisher
ROYAL SOC
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0233
Keywords
adaptation; cultural evolution; game theory; institutions; social behaviour
Categories
Funding
- NICHD NIH HHS [R24 HD042828, R24 HD042828-10] Funding Source: Medline
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Human populations have extraordinary capabilities for generating behavioural diversity without corresponding genetic diversity or change. These capabilities and their consequences can be grouped into three categories: strategic (or cognitive), ecological and cultural-evolutionary. Strategic aspects include: (i) a propensity to employ complex conditional strategies, some certainly genetically evolved but others owing to directed invention or to cultural evolution; (ii) situations in which fitness payoffs (or utilities) are frequency-dependent, so that there is no one best strategy; and (iii) the prevalence of multiple equilibria, with history or minor variations in starting conditions (path dependence) playing a crucial role. Ecological aspects refer to the fact that social behaviour and cultural institutions evolve in diverse niches, producing various adaptive radiations and local adaptations. Although environmental change can drive behavioural change, in humans, it is common for behavioural change (especially technological innovation) to drive environmental change (i. e. niche construction). Evolutionary aspects refer to the fact that human capacities for innovation and cultural transmission lead to diversification and cumulative cultural evolution; critical here is institutional design, in which relatively small shifts in incentive structure can produce very different aggregate outcomes. In effect, institutional design can reshape strategic games, bringing us full circle.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available