Journal
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
Volume 36, Issue 3, Pages 381-384Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2007.08.003
Keywords
advertising; differential games; oligopoly
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We investigate a linear state differential game of advertising, under Cournot and Bertrand competition. A unique saddlepoint equilibrium exists if the marginal cost of advertising is sufficiently low. Bertrand competition entails more intense advertising than Cournot competition, since increasing market size is more important to firms when competition is tough. (C) 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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