Modeling Disaster: The Failure of the Management of the New England Groundfish Industry

Most of the world's marine fisheries are overexploited or endangered, including the Gulf of Maine groundfish fishery, once one of the world's most prolific. After 35 years of management, groundfish stock sizes and catches are lower than when management began. We argue that in New England, the groundfishing industry is caught in a prisoner's dilemma caused by a large number of interactive social, political, and economic variables. These factors have (1) motivated fishermen to oppose the rules promulgated by the government (which we call the harvest game) and (2) lowered the benefits of investing in rules to conserve fish stocks (which we call the rule game). In both games, fishermen are motivated to play their dominant strategy to the detriment of the industry, conservation, and fish stocks. We suggest that the dilemma will only be solved by a change in the culture of the industry that would lead to support for a conservation ethic. Unfortunately, the current institutional framework of management does not support the development of such an ethic. Rational-choice theory and concepts from evolutionary game theory add to our understanding of the dilemma facing those concerned with groundfish management in this region.