Journal
NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS
Volume 13, Issue -, Pages -Publisher
IOP PUBLISHING LTD
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/13/7/073024
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Funding
- Elite Network of Bavaria
- BMBF
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The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can easily be obscured if the eavesdropper can utilize technical imperfections in the actual implementation. Here, we describe and experimentally demonstrate a very simple but highly effective attack that does not need to intercept the quantum channel at all. Only by exploiting the dead time effect of single-photon detectors is the eavesdropper able to gain (asymptotically) full information about the generated keys without being detected by state-of-the-art QKD protocols. In our experiment, the eavesdropper inferred up to 98.8% of the key correctly, without increasing the bit error rate between Alice and Bob significantly. However, we find an even simpler and more effective countermeasure to inhibit this and similar attacks.
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