Journal
NETWORKS & SPATIAL ECONOMICS
Volume 13, Issue 1, Pages 1-42Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11067-012-9171-5
Keywords
Energy markets modeling; Game theory; Generalized Nash-Cournot equilibria; Quasi-variational inequality
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This article presents a dynamic Generalized Nash-Cournot model to describe the evolution of the natural gas markets. The major players along the gas chain are depicted including: producers, consumers, storage and pipeline operators, as well as intermediate local traders. Our economic structure description takes into account market power and the demand representation tries to capture the possible fuel substitution that can be made between the consumption of oil, coal, and natural gas in the overall fossil energy consumption. We also take into account long-term contracts in an endogenous way, which makes the model a Generalized Nash Equilibrium problem. We discuss some means to solve such problems. Our model has been applied to represent the European natural gas market and forecast, until 2030, after a calibration process, consumption, prices, production, and natural gas dependence. A comparison between our model, a more standard one that does not take into account energy substitution, and the European Commission natural gas forecasts is carried out to analyze our results. Finally, in order to illustrate the possible use of fuel substitution, we studied the evolution of the natural gas price as compared to the coal and oil prices.
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