Journal
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES
Volume 55, Issue 3, Pages 281-291Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.10.005
Keywords
equal split solution; Nash bargaining solution; noncooperative bargaining game
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This note examines a noncooperative bargaining game model to implement the equal split solution in a transferable utility coalitional form game provided by Hart and Mas-Colell [Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A., 1996. Bargaining and value. Econometrica 64, 357-380]. We first clarify the relationship between the equal split solution and the Nash bargaining solution in a coalitional form game and extend the model to a nontransferable utility coalitional form game. We then provide a sufficient condition for generating the Nash bargaining solution payoff configuration and the equal split solution as the limit of the stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs of Hart and Mas-Colell's bargaining game when the probabilities of the breakdown of negotiations converge to zero. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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