Journal
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Volume 57, Issue 4, Pages 611-627Publisher
INFORMS
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1296
Keywords
decision analysis; applications; organizational studies; decision making; motivation; incentives
Funding
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [KR2077/2-1, IR43/1-1, HA4462/1-1, HA4462/1-2]
- European Union through the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR [FMRX-CT98-0238]
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations, reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent. We study sabotage in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads. Additionally, we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name sabotage. Communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output. If sabotage is not possible, the principals choose tournament incentives more often.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available