Journal
JOURNAL OF TRAUMA AND ACUTE CARE SURGERY
Volume 72, Issue 6, Pages 1709-1713Publisher
LIPPINCOTT WILLIAMS & WILKINS
DOI: 10.1097/TA.0b013e318250cd10
Keywords
Fort Hood Massacre; mass casualty incident; Scott & White Hospital; trauma maldistribution
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BACKGROUND: On November 5, 2009, an army psychiatrist at Fort Hood in Killeen, TX, allegedly opened fire at the largest US military base in the world, killing 13 and wounding 32. METHODS: Data from debriefing sessions, news media, and area hospitals were reviewed. RESULTS: Ten patients were initially transferred to the regional Level I trauma center. The remainder of the shooting victims were triaged to two other local regional hospitals. National news networks broadcasted the Level I trauma center's referral phone line which resulted in more than 1,300 calls. The resulting difficulties in communication led to the transfer of two victims (one critical) to a regional hospital without a trauma designation. CONCLUSIONS: Triage at the scene was compromised by a lack of a secure environment, leading to undertriage of several patients. Overload of routine communication pathways compounded the problem, suggesting redundancy is crucial. (J Trauma Acute Care Surg. 2012;72: 1709-1713. Copyright (C) 2012 by Lippincott Williams & Wilkins)
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