Journal
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Volume 82, Issue 5, Pages 879-891Publisher
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
DOI: 10.1086/683326
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The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning are two puzzling examples of probabilistic confirmation. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, they constitute a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made in a Bayesian framework that represents credal states by single credence functions to avoid these conclusions, but none of them can do so for all versions of the Doomsday argument. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of ignorance and explains away these puzzles.
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