Journal
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY
Volume 38, Issue 3, Pages 147-174Publisher
TAYLOR & FRANCIS INC
DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2012.724486
Keywords
conventions; coordination; opinion dynamics; social influence
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Models of opinion formation are used to investigate many collective phenomena. While social influence often constitutes a basic mechanism, its implementation differs between the models. In this article, we provide a general framework of social influence based on dissonance minimization. We only premise that individuals strive to minimize dissonance resulting from different opinions compared to individuals in a given social network. Within a game theoretic context, we show that our concept of dissonance minimization resembles a coordination process when interactions are homogeneous. We further show that different models of opinion formation can be represented as best response dynamics within our framework. Thus, we offer a unifying perspective on these heterogeneous models and link them to rational choice theory.
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