Journal
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
Volume 46, Issue 2, Pages 179-190Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.003
Keywords
Dynamic tournaments; Contests; Sabotage; Heterogeneity
Categories
Funding
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
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This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, is sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if all players start off at the same position, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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