Journal
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
Volume 45, Issue 9-10, Pages 609-623Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.12.003
Keywords
Convergence of equilibria; Global interactions; Local interactions; Random interaction structure
Categories
Funding
- National Science Foundation [SES0350770]
- German Academic Exchange Service
- NSERC
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In this paper, we establish a convergence result for equilibria in systems of social interactions with many locally and globally interacting players. Assuming spacial homogeneity and that interactions between different agents are not too strong, we show that equilibria of systems with finitely many players converge to the unique equilibrium of a benchmark system with infinitely many agents. We prove convergence of individual actions and of average behavior. Our results also apply to it class of interaction games. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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