Journal
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH
Volume 52, Issue 17, Pages 5070-5085Publisher
TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2014.895446
Keywords
supply chain management; fairness concern; status seeking; Nash bargaining; behavioral operations
Categories
Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71271199, 70901067]
- National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars of China [71225002]
- Science Fund for Creative Research Groups of China [71121061]
- Program Cai Yuanpei of the China Scholarship Council [26058PL]
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China [WK2040160008]
Ask authors/readers for more resources
The paper investigates newsvendor problem for a dyadic supply chain in which both the supplier and the retailer have the preference of status-seeking with fairness concerns. Nash bargaining solution is introduced as the fairness reference point and equilibrium results are derived. The effects of fairness-concerned status-seeking behaviors on optimal decisions as well as channel efficiency are further analyzed. It is shown that the channel efficiency will decrease because of such behavioral preference. The retailer's share will be larger when the supplier concerns fairness less, and the supplier's sensitivity to fairness plays a relatively more important role for the channel efficiency. Additionally, another interesting managerial insight is concluded that fairness concerns will not change the status of channel coordination in certain conditions. More specifically, those contracts able (unable) to coordinate fairness-neutral supply chain, based on affine transformations with scale factors within certain ranges, still succeed (fail) to coordinate the fairness-concerned. Furthermore, several insights on bargaining powers are given as well.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available