Journal
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS
Volume 113, Issue 2, Pages 518-527Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2007.10.024
Keywords
supply-chain coordination; inventory-level-dependent demand; profit-sharing mechanism; quantity discount
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in this paper, we consider coordination issues of a distribution system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer offers a single product to the retailer and the demand for the product at the retailer's end is stock dependent. We focus on three aspects of the resulting supply chain. First, we discuss the manufacturer-Stackelberg game structure to determine how the manufacturer sets the wholesale price of the product and how the retailer in turn determines the order quantity. We assume that both the parties share relevant cost information. Then we develop a simple profit-sharing mechanism that would ultimately achieve perfect channel coordination. Finally, the manufacturer is provided with a quantity discount scheme to induce the retailer to increase the order quantity so as to maximize the manufacturer's profit. We show that this discount scheme also achieves the perfect coordination of the whole channel. Numerical examples are used to illustrate the models. (C) 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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