Journal
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
Volume 42, Issue 2, Pages 501-520Publisher
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0336-8
Keywords
Decision choice; Bargaining; Conflict resolution; Counteroffer; Implementation
Categories
Funding
- University of York
Ask authors/readers for more resources
A bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism is proposed to solve a fundamental two-person decision choice problem with two alternatives. It yields a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, and leads to an intuitive overall solution that offers a reconciliation between egalitarianism and utilitarianism. We then investigate the axiomatic foundation of the solution. Furthermore, we compare it with several conventional strategic approaches to this setting.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available
Share Paper
