Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
Volume 27, Issue 2, Pages 752-761Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2011.2170439
Keywords
Electricity pool; equilibria; equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC); locational marginal price (LMP); mixed-integer linear programming (MILP); power producer; offering strategy
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Funding
- Government of Castilla-La Mancha [POII11-0102-0275]
- Ministry of Science and Innovation of Spain through CICYT [DPI2009-09573]
- Ministry of Science and Innovation of Spain [AP 2007-02746]
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We study the equilibria reached by strategic producers in a pool-based network-constrained electricity market. The behavior of each producer is modeled by a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) whose objective is maximizing profit and whose complementarity constraints describe market clearing. The joint solution of all these MPECs constitutes an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). The equilibria associated with the EPEC are analyzed by solving the strong stationarity conditions of all MPECs, which can be linearized without approximation by mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) techniques. The resulting mixed-integer linear conditions can be reformulated as an optimization problem that allows establishing diverse objectives to differentiate among alternative equilibria.
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